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ABSTRACT
We consider a recent business and policy question of ”how
and why does a ﬁrm use online markets versus traditional
oﬄine markets ?” using a unique dataset of more than 3000
auctions held by Sotheby’s online at eBay and oﬄine at New
York in June-July2002. We ﬁnd robust empirical regularities
in our dataset about the use of online markets. First, the
average transaction price is more than 10 times higher in
oﬄine markets. This fact strongly suggests that the seller
is not simply randomly assigning assets between online and
oﬄine markets. Second, the higher the mean and spread of
pre-auction estimates of an asset, the more likely seller is
to sell the asset in oﬄine markets. Third, the transaction
rate is higher in oﬄine markets. Next, we build a simple
model of oﬄine and online markets to identify the business
logic behind these empirical regularities. We model oﬄine
m a r k e t sa sa na u c t i o nw i t he ndogeneous entry a la McAfee
and McMillan (1987) where the traders pay transaction costs
to hold transactions. We model online markets as standard
ascending auctions. In online markets, the seller can save
transaction costs and entry by bidders is easy, but the seller
cannot reveal much information, leading to higher valuation
risk and severe winner’s curse. The seller sells the asset with
high valuation risk in oﬄine markets to alleviate winner’s
curse. In order to compensate for the transaction costs, the
expected value of the asset sold in oﬄine markets is higher.
Since the seller’s proﬁti se q u a lt os o c i a ls u r p l u si no ﬄine
markets due to entry costs, the seller is more eager to sell
assets. Finally we provide a simple maximum likelihood
estimation of transaction costs and information revelation
eﬀects based on discrete choice models.
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Due to recent developments of Internet-based transaction
technologies, online markets are increasingly important in
our economic activities. According to the US Census Bu-
reau, the estimate of U.S. retail e-commerce sales for the
second quarter of 2002, not adjusted for seasonal, holiday,
and trading-day diﬀerences, was $10.243 billion, an increase
of 24.2 percent from the second quarter of 2001. In 2000, in
the manufacturing industry, ecommerce accounted for 18.4%
(777 billion dollars) of the total value of shipments.
Still we have not yet reached a consensus about poten-
tials and limitations of online markets. In this paper, we
try to answer business and policy needs for more precise un-
derstandings of online markets by studying how a ﬁrm uses
online markets in practice and what metrics will inﬂuence
its behavior.
We brieﬂy review previous results in four areas: Internet
auctions, comparisons between online and oﬄine markets,
and art auctions.
First, we explore Internet auctions, especially eBay mar-
kets. Bajari and Hortacsu (2002a) discovered last minutes
bidding phenomena and presented the ﬁrst structural esti-
mation of eBay markets. Bajari and Hortacsu (2002b) sum-
marized results in this area up to early 2002.
Second, we look at competitions in online markets. Baye,
Morgan, and Scholten (2001) studied price dispersion among
online sellers. Ellison and Ellison (2001) focused on price
search engines. Goolsbee and Chevalier (2002) examined
sales ranks and prices in online bookstores.
Third, comparisons between online and oﬄine market user
behavior. Goolsbee (2000) studied consumers’ computer
purchases. Brown and Goolsbee (2000) studied insurance
policy prices and consumer surplus. Choi, Laibson, and
Metrick (2001) compared online traders with phone-based
traders. Carlton and Chevalier (2001) studied consumer
free-riding by online retailers.
Finally we review art auctions. Ashenfelter (1989) pre-
sented a systematic description of art auction markets in-
cluding the discussion on unbiasedness of sales estimates
and declining price anomalies.
125Our dataset records the result of 3000+ auctions held by
Sotheby’s online and oﬄine in June and July 2002. This
dataset includes all sales activities by Sotheby’s on the Inter-
net and almost all activities at Sotheby’s New York, which
used US dollars during that period. We collected the auction
data from the Internet using Perl codes.
We identiﬁed three empirical regularities. First, the mean
sales price in oﬄi n ea u c t i o n si sm o r et h a n1 0t i m e sh i g h e r
than that in online auctions. This result strongly suggests
that the seller is not assigning assets randomly between on-
line and oﬄi n em a r k e t s .T h e nh o wd o e st h es e l l e rc h o o s eb e -
tween online and oﬄine ? We went on to study pre-auction
estimates provided by the seller. We noticed that, higher
t h ee s t i m a t ed i s p e r s i o no rh i g h e rt h ee s t i m a t em e a no fa n
asset, more likely the seller is to sell the asset oﬄine. Third,
the transaction rate oﬄine is higher than that online. Anec-
dotal evidence from eBay’s art auctions in 2000 suggests
robustness of the ﬁnding.
We formulate a simple microstructure model of online and
oﬄine markets. We model online markets as standard as-
cending auctions: The bidders estimate the value of the as-
s e tf r o mt h ed e s c r i p t i o ni ne B a yw e bp a g ea n dc o m p e t ei n
an ascending auction. We model oﬄine markets as auctions
with endogenous entry where the potential bidders pay par-
ticipation costs (e.g. ﬂying or sending bidding agents to
New York ) to obtain an estimate at the preview and com-
pete in the auction. These diﬀerences in market structures
highlight trade-oﬀs: In online markets, the seller can save
transaction costs, and there is more competition due to low
participation costs. However, the seller cannot reveal much
information, so the bidders face high valuation uncertainty
and severe winner’s curse.
Third, we study a business logic behind these empirical
regularities.
Suppose an asset has high valuation uncertainty. Take an
example of a classical watch created in 1725 (which was on
sale and purchased in an oﬄine auction.) If the seller sells
the asset online, bidders only receive information from the
webpage, so they are uncertain of the value of the asset.
Thus, bidders will bid cautiously to avoid winner’s curse.
Then the seller cannot get high sales prices. On the other
hand, if the seller sells the asset oﬄine, the seller can hold
the preview and bidders can inspect the asset by themselves.
Then, being sure of the value of the asset, bidders will bid
more aggressively. Thus the seller will get higher prices.
Also, if an asset has higher valuation uncertainty, then bid-
ders will bid cautiously, so they can get the asset with lower
price,and receive higher expected proﬁte xa n t e .T h u s ,m o r e
bidders will enter the auction, so the competition advantage
of online auctions will decrease. Therefore, for both reasons,
the seller will choose to sell the asset in oﬄine auctions if
the expected value of the asset is high enough to cover the
transaction costs.
Next, we consider the transaction rate. In online markets,
the seller wishes to exclude some bidders whose marginal
r e v e n u ei sl e s st h a nz e r o . B u ti no ﬄine markets, since the
bidder has zero expected proﬁt under free entry equilibrium,
the seller’s expected proﬁt is equal to social surplus, so the
seller does not exclude bidders.
In conclusion, online markets have the potential of low
transaction costs and easiness of entry, and the limitation
of low information revelation and winner’s curse. The seller
should weigh carefully these advantages and disadvantages
paying attention to metrics such as the number and informa-
tion processing ability of potential customers, the valuation
characteristics of the asset, and transaction costs and infor-
mational revelation in the oﬄine transaction process.
For contributions, this paper ﬁrst presents empirical reg-
ularities and theoretical reasoning behind the use of online
markets by an asset seller. In previous studies, the data on
the ﬁrm’s activities between online and oﬄine markets are
mostly anecdotal.
Second, we contribute to a study of comparative statics
of auctions. We use mean-dispersion family distributions
for underlying signals. Mean-dispersion family covers wide
range of distributions such as Gaussian, Uniform, and Log-
normal. Mean-dispersion distributions are tractable because
the expectation of the order statistics and hazard rate can
be expressed by those of the baseline distribution. Since the
bidder’s expected proﬁti nt h ea u c t i o ni se x p r e s s e du s i n g
the expectation of order statistics and hazard rate, we can
compute quantitative comparative statics.
2. OFFLINE AND ONLINE MARKETS
In this section, we provide institutional descriptions of
oﬄine and online market structures used by Sotheby’s.
2.1 Ofﬂine markets
Sotheby’s oﬄine markets have four steps: consignment,
cataloguing, exhibition, and sale. After a prospective seller
contacts Sotheby’s, its specialists check the asset’s authen-
ticity and appraise its value. The owner then consigns the
asset to Sotheby’s, which puts it in an upcoming auction.
Sotheby’s auctions usually have a theme, such as “20th Cen-
tury Works of Art” or “Egyptian, Classical, and Western
Asiatic Antiques,” so the sale is delayed until there is an
auction that it ﬁts. The auction catalog, which is avail-
able about one month ahead of the auction, contains a de-
scription of the asset, its exhibition history, and reference
notes with an upper and lower-bound estimates. The seller
mounts an exhibition of the assets to be sold a few days
before the auction. The exhibition is open to the public,
and Sotheby’s specialists are on hand to answer questions.
Finally there is the auction itself, run with open ascend-
ing bidding. Major sales are social events for the glitterati.
S p a c ei nt h ea u c t i o nr o o mi ss c a r c es os e a t sa r er a t i o n e d ,
the most desirable seats (Watson(1992)) being assigned to
clients who have spent heavily in the recent past.
2.2 Online markets
Sotheby’s online markets have a checkered history. Sotheby’s
began online operations in January 2000 as a joint venture
between Sotheby’s and Amazon.com. This alliance was dis-
solved after nine months. (The end came ﬁve days after
Sotheby’s pleaded guilty to colluding with Christie’s to ﬁx
fees in their oﬄine auctions.) The seller operated the online
markets on its own from October 2000 to June 2002. During
this time it sold goods worth over $100 million in a period
when the art market in general was depressed, but it lost
money because of the web site’s high set-up costs. Then
Sotheby’s formed a joint venture with eBay. The joint ven-
ture replaced eBay Premiere, eBay’s own site for high-end
auctions, while Sotheby’s online business moved to eBay’s
web site, allowing Sotheby’s to cut staﬀ and expenditures in
its online division. Our dataset comes from eBay auctions
held by Sotheby’s.
1262.3 Comparison between two markets
T h eo n l i n em a r k e t sd i ﬀer from the oﬄine markets in four
respects.
First, rather than large auction events with speciﬁct h e m e s
at discrete times, miscellaneous assets are continuously on
oﬀer via the web site.
Second, the auction is run by eBay’s rules; in particular,
each auction has a ﬁxed end-time, and Sotheby’s is subject
to the seller rating system.
Third, the oﬄine markets have higher transaction costs.
In oﬄine auctions the sale must wait until a suitable auc-
tion is scheduled, bringing costs of delay for the seller. The
seller incurs costs in mounting the exhibition and in running
the theatrical performance that makes up an oﬄine auction.
The bidders incur travel costs and other costs of participat-
ing; the seller bears these costs indirectly via lower bids
and fewer bidders (McAfee and McMillan (1987)). In online
markets, the seller pays the cost of producing the website de-
scriptions, though these are presumably no larger than the
oﬄine-auction costs of catalog preparation. Bidders’ costs
of participating online are negligible.
Finally, the oﬄine auctions generate more information for
bidders than the online markets. In an oﬄine auction, bid-
ders inspect the asset at the preview exhibition and can
ask questions of the art experts present. In an online auc-
tion, bidders get only what information is posted on the web
page, which is similar to what we have in catalog, including
auction estimates by the experts
1.
3. DATAANDEMPIRICALREGULARITIES
We now report the result of the examination of the data.
3.1 Data
We collect data on oﬄine markets from Sotheby’s website
2
a n dd a t ao no n l i n ea u c t i o n sf r o me B a yw e b s i t e
3 using Perl
codes running on Unix servers. The data are collected for
online transactions where the seller is Sotheby’s at eBay be-
tween June 26 and July 23, 2002. The data are collected for
oﬄine transactions closed from June 1 to June 30, 2002, at
New York Sotheby’s using the US dollar. Why the diﬀerence
in dates ? Sotheby’s started selling at eBay from June 13,
2002, and we wanted two weeks’ adjustment periods before
starting the collection of the data.
In our dataset, there are 1890 oﬄine auctions and 1300
online auctions. The basic summary statistics follows:
oﬄine markets online markets
Number of auctions 1890 1300
E n d e di ns a l e 1213 517
Total Sales 23572639 682845
Table 1. Summary Statistics
1What are the examples of these information which can be
acquired in the previews? A catalogue states, ” Neither we
nor the Consignor make any warranties or representations of
the correctness of the catalogueo ro t h e rd e s c r i p t i o no fp h y s -
ical condition size, quantity, rarity, importance, medium,
provenance, exhibitions, literature or historical relevance of
the property and no statement anywhere, whether oral or
written, shall be deemed such a warranty or representation.
Prospective bidders should inspect the property before bid-
ding to determine its condition, size or whether or not it has
been repaired or restored. ”(Sotheby’s (1988))
2http://search.sotheby’s.com/liveauctions/
3http://pages.ebay.com/search/items/basicsearch.html
It is diﬃcult to classify the assets objectively into cate-
gories. For oﬄi n ea u c t i o n s ,w es i m p l yu s et h et i t l eo fa u c -
tions as a proxy of categories. There were eight auctions in
June of 2002 at Sotheby’s New York: Old Masters Paintings
on June 5; 20th century Works of Arts on June 7; Important
Jewels on June 12; Arcade Jewelry on June 13; Egyptian,
Classical and Western Asiatic Antiques and Islamic Works
of Art on June 13; Fine Books and Manuscripts on June
16; Masterpieces from the Time Museum on June 19; and
Important Watches, Wristwatches and Clocks on June 20.
In online markets, we use the categorization by eBay.
In their categories, there are ancient and ethnographic art;
Asian art; Books and Manuscripts; Ceramics and Glass; Col-
lectibles and Memorabilia; Furniture and Decorative Arts;
Jewelry; Paintings-Drawings -Sculpture; Photographs; Prints;





Clocks, Time Museum 562 41
Exotic Antiques 286 0
Books, Prints 283 37
Painting 152 113
Furniture 0 233
Silver, ceramics 0 259
Photo, stamps, coins 0 272
Collectibles 0 356
Table 2. Comparisons between two markets
We now begin our examination of the data. First, we look
at the transaction price.
3.2 Findings 1.
The transaction price is higher in oﬄine markets.
First, the mean sales price is 18801 dollars in oﬄine mar-
kets and 1483 in online markets. We provide histograms
4
and summary statistics below. The ﬁrst histogram records
the distribution of sales prices for oﬄine markets. The ﬁrst
histogram records the distribution of sales prices for oﬄine
auctions. It shows that the distribution of the sales prices
is quite skewed.










Transaction prices - offline auctions



















4When we draw histograms, we removed upper 3% of the
samples to improve the graphics.
127The next histogram shows the distribution of sales prices
for online auctions. The distribution is again skewed. The
distribution of the sale price in online auctions is similar to
that in oﬄine auctions, except for the fact that the price is
measured in terms of 10K in the oﬄine aucions.






























The summary statistics of the sales price in oﬄine auctions
and online auctions is recorded below. The number of sales
observations in oﬄine markets, 1213, is smaller than the
number of total observations in oﬄine markets, 1890, since
there are 587 auctions which ended in nonsale. For the high-
est price in oﬄine markets, it was George Graham’s time-
pieces with 1,219,500 dollars. In online markets, it was a
Frank Lloyd Wright Copper Weed Holder with 83,750 dol-
lars. For the lowest price, in oﬄine markets, it was a Cartier
1 9 9 5w a t c hw i t h3 5 8d o l l a r s . I no n l i n em a r k e t s ,i tw a sa
Nicole Hornby Magnol with 11.5 dollars.
Obs Mean Std dev 10% 50% 90%
Oﬀ 1213 18801 70563 1912 7170 32682
On 517 1483 4136 202 690 2815
Table 3. Transaction Prices
These data shows that the average sales price in oﬄine
market is We interpret this diﬀerence as a strong evidence
that the seller sells diﬀerent assets in online and oﬄine mar-
kets. One possibility is that the diﬀerence in the number of
bidders between oﬄi n ea n do n l i n ea u c t i o n si sac a u s eo ft h e
diﬀerence in the sale prices for an identical object. But if it
were true, then, since the entry cost in the online auctions
i sl o w e rt h a ni nt h eo ﬄine auctions, the number of potential
number of bidders will be larger in online auctions than in
oﬄine auctions, so the average price of the online auctions
would be higher than that of the oﬄine auctions. But this
contradicts with the data.
Now let us explore how the seller allocates an asset be-
tween online and oﬄi n em a r k e t s .W ew i l le x a m i n et h ep r e -
auction estimate.
3.3 Findings 2.
The seller sells assets with higher estimate means (= (the
lower estimate + the higher estimate )/2 ) in oﬄine mar-
kets.
First, the estimate mean is 13174 in oﬄine markets and
1592 for online markets.












Estimate average - offline auctions














































Obs Mean Std dev 10% 50% 90%
Oﬀ 1890 13174 27018 1750 6000 25000
On 1300 1592 3392 250 825 2775
Table 4. Distributions of Estimates mean
F o rt h eh i g h e s te s t i m a t em e a ni no ﬄine markets, it is a
Pierre Frederich Ingold timepiece with 375000 dollars (sold).
In online markets, it is Norma Jeane Baker’s Wedding Gown
with 60000 dollars (unsold). For the lowest estimate means
in oﬄine market, it is 1995 Cartier travel watch with 600
dollars (sold). In online market, it is a Lee Tanner’s photo-
graph of John Coltrane with 15 dollars (unsold).
We run a probit regression on 3190 samples. The co-
eﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant from zero. We express
EstAvg in terms of 100 dollars.
Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Estavg (per 100 dollars) .0158555 .0065756
Const -.4413621 .0317562
Table 5. Eﬀect of Estimate Average on the Channel
Choice
We observe a similar regularity for estimate dispersion
(the upper estimate - the lower estimate).
1283.4 Findings 3.
The seller sells assets with higher estimate dispersions in
oﬄine markets.












Estimate spread - offline auctions

















































Obs Mean Std dev 10% 50% 90%
Oﬀ 1890 4492 12347 500 2000 10000
On 1300 523 1141 100 300 1000
Table 6. Distributions of Estimate dispersions
For the highest estimate dispersions, in oﬄine, it is a Pierre
Ingold timepiece with 250000 dollars (sold). In online, it is
a Norma Jean Wedding Dress with 20000 dollars (unsold).
For the lowest estimate dispersion, in oﬄine, it is a ’Fouga’
wristwatch with 100 dollars (sold). In online, it is Lee Tan-
ner’s photo with 10 dollars (unsold).
The result of a probit regression is given below.
Coeﬃcient Standard Error
EstDiﬀ (per 100 dollars) .05531648 .00199457
Const -.4832916 .0333872
Table 7. The eﬀect of estimate diﬀerence
Both coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
3.5 Findings 4.
The transaction rate (the rate at which an auction ended
in sale) is higher in oﬄine auctions.
First, in oﬄine markets, the transaction rate is 64.1% and
in online markets, the transaction rate is 39.7%. The break-
down of the sales among categories are given below.
Oﬄine Online
Master Paintings 0.98 Coins 0.8
Time Museum 0.97 Furniture 0.66
20th Century Art 0.67 Watch 0.63
Watches 0.66 Paintings 0.55
Antique Jewels 0.64 Silver 0.47
Books 0.57 Ceramics 0.46
Arcade Jewels 0.58 Prints 0.33
Jewels 0.49 Collectibles 0.28
Table 8. Transaction rates: category comparison.
In addition, there is evidence to suggest robustness of the
diﬀerence in transaction rates. In 2000, eBay held auctions
of arts, calling it the Great Collection Auction. Guzman, an
eBay representative mentioned the diﬀerence in transaction
rates: ”... (A)approximately 48 percent of the lots oﬀered
by GC result in a sale. That ﬁgure is rather impressive by
online standards but pales when compared to oﬄine auc-
tions, in which rates of 70 percent sold and higher are not
uncommon. At Christie’s Manhattan headquarters in 1999,
for example, the mean sale rate for lots oﬀered in categories
ranging from antiquities to Impressionist paintings was 89
percent. ” (Tully (2000))
Finally, we note ’last-minutes bidding’ phenomena in on-
line auctions.
3.6 Findings 5.
In online auctions, bidders submit bids at the very close
to the end of the auction.
Bajari and Hortacsu (2002) discovered last-minutes bid-
ding phenomena: the bids are concentrated at the end of
the auction. We conﬁrm their ﬁndings in our data of on-
line auctions. In online markets, the mean bid is made in
0.78403 of the length of the auction. The median is 0.956.










The timing of bidding - online auctions



















Obs Mean Std dev 10% 50% 90%
1860 .784 .302 .205 .956 .999
Table 9. Timing of Bidding
1294. THE MODEL
In this section we present our formulations and derive an
equilibrium in each market. First, we present our formula-
tion of players.
4.1 Players
First, the seller is deﬁned by a unit endowment of an asset
with zero valuation and uncertainty neutral preferences.
Second, bidder i =1,...,N is deﬁned by a scalar signal xi;
the payoﬀ function ui(s,x) − p where x =( xi,x −i)i st h e
vector of signals, s is the information variable, and p is the
payment; and uncertainty-neutral preferences. We assume
ui is symmetric, nondecreasing, continuously diﬀerentiable.
We model oﬄine markets with endogenous entry.
4.2 Ofﬂine markets
First, the seller provides information on the asset in the
auction catalogue. The information revelation is truthful
5.
Second, each potential bidder decides whether to enter
the auction. At the time of the choice, each potential bid-
der reads the catalogue. Each bidder learns the number of
bidders who have already showed interests and entered the
auction
6.
Third, if potential bidder i decides to enter, bidder i
spends a participation cost c ∈ (0,C)f o rs o m eC ∈ R++.
Fourth, each bidder attends the preview and estimate the
signal x
off
i from the distribution F
off.
F i f t h ,t h eb i d d e r sc o m p e t ei na na s c e n d i n ga u c t i o nw i t h
a secret reserve price r
off. The seller pays a cost c to hold
an auction.
There are three comments on the formulation.
First, bidders learn the signal after the entry decision. In
an actual auction process, the bidders have to arrange the
visit to the preview in New York before the inspection of
the asset.
Second, potential bidders decide entry sequentially a la
McAfee and McMillan (1987). Here we generalize McAfee
and McMillan model to allow for more general value struc-
t u r e s .L e v i na n dS m i t h( 1 9 9 4 )m o d e l e ds i m u l t a n e o u se n t r y .
There are no essential diﬀerences between two formulations
since both of the analysis are driven by bidder’s zero proﬁt
conditions.
Third, every bidder has to pay the participation cost. Bid-
ders with telephone bidding will be at informational disad-
vantage and may not earn positive expected payoﬀs
7.
In contrast, we model online ’frictionless’ markets as stan-
dard ascending auctions.
4.3 Online markets
First, the seller reveals information on the asset on the
webpage. The seller reveals information truthfully because
of its guarantee
8 and the eBay’s feedback rating system.
5An oﬄine auction catalogue states, ” We guarantee the au-
thenticity of Authorship of each lots contained in this cat-
alogue... ’Authorship’, locations the identity of the creator,
the period, culture, source of origin of property, as the case
may be, as set forth in the Bold Type Heading of such cat-
alogue entry.”(Sotheby’s (1988))
6This information which might be available from the conver-
sations with Sotheby’s specialists when the potential bidders
try to arrange a visit to preview.
7For example. Milgrom and Weber (1982), theorem 7.
8”Each seller guarantees that the authorship, period,
Second, each bidder i =1 ,...,N enters the auction.





Fourth, bidders compete in an ascending auction. The
seller put the reserve price r
on ∈ R.
We now explain the distributional assumptions.
4.4 Distributional assumptions




i belongs to a mean-dispersion
family with a mean zero base random variable z with a distri-
bution function F
Z and continuously diﬀerentiable density
f











N ), j =on, oﬀ is indepen-
dent.
Third, S and X
j,j=on, oﬀ are ’uniformly strictly aﬃli-





E[ui(s,x)|X = x] ≤ M
This assumption is satisﬁed in many standard functional
forms such as the mean common value ui(s,x)=
P
xi/N
and Wilson (1998) log normal model of ui(s,x)=sxi.R e -
call aﬃliation already implies that E[u(s,x)|X = x]i sn o n -
decreasing in each arguments.
Fourth, both of X
off
i ,a n dX
on
i satisfy increasing hazard
rate condition
10.





on for some 0 <k<1. k is the parameter
measuring the reduction in dispersion in oﬄine auctions.
k = 0 implies complete reduction in dispersion and k =1
implies zero reduction.
5. EXPLANATIONS OF EMPIRICAL REG-
ULARITIES
In this section, we give a heuristic explanation of these
empirical regularities based on the model presented in the
previous section. The full analysis of the model is delegated
to Kazumori and McMillan (2003).
5.1 The effect of the estimate dispersion
In section 2, we found that higher estimate dispersion
leads to the choice of oﬄine markets. The argument is as
follows: The higher estimate dispersion implies severe win-
ner’s curse. It will lead to more cautious bidding, lower sales
price, and higher bidder proﬁts.
Now suppose the seller chooses oﬄine markets. First, by
selling in oﬄine markets, the seller can provide better in-
formation to the bidders. The bidder will then bid more
culture or origin of the lot is as set out in the Guar-
anteed sections of the View item page in the de-
scription of the lot.” and this guarantee is valid for














Intuitively, a member of location-scale family is obtained by
as h i f ti nm e a nµ and dispersion σ of the base distribution.
10The hazard rate of the random variable x is h(x)=
f(x)/(1 − F(x)).
130aggressively, creating a higher sales price for the seller. This
eﬀect is larger as the initial estimate dispersion. Second,
the higher estimate dispersion implies more serious winner’s
curse, which will imply higher bidder’s rent. Thus more
bidders will enter the auction even after the information
revelation. This will diminish the competition advantage in
online auctions.
5.2 The effect of the estimate mean
The arguments in the previous sections do not immedi-
ately suggest that the seller sells the expensive asset in on-
line auctions. A shift in the mean value of the asset, given
that the asset has the same dispersion, does not aﬀect the
bidder’s expected proﬁti ns t a n d a r dm o d e l s .A sar e s u l t ,t h e
comparison between online and oﬄi n ea u c t i o n si si n d e p e n -
dent on the shift in the mean value. Then why do sellers
choose to sell the expensive art assets in oﬄine auctions ?
First, in oﬄine auction, the seller has to pay transaction
costs for the seller itself and the entry cost of the bidders
indirectly. If the expected sales price from an oﬄine auction
does not cover these transaction costs, the seller will not
hold an oﬄine auction.
Second, the seller does not want to sell the asset with lower
expected value because it usually implies that the asset has
lower dispersions.
Third, in the case of art assets, expensive assets have large
valuation uncertainty, and the gains from information rev-
e l a t i o ni nt h eo ﬄine trading processes are larger. On the
other hand, in case of ﬁnancial assets such as equity and
bonds, oﬄine transaction does not aﬀect the valuation un-
certainty of these assets. As a result, there are no merits in
trading these assets oﬄine given the transaction costs sav-
ing in online trading. Another piece of indirect evidence is
that an expensive asset with a small valuation uncertainty
can be successfully sold in online auctions. An example of
this successful auction of a copy of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence for 8.14 million at Sothebys.com in 2000. On the
other hand, Marylin Monroe’s wedding dress, oﬀered on sale
on the Internet was not purchased.
5.3 The difference in the sale rate
I ns e c t i o n2 ,w es a wt h a tt h eo ﬄine auction has the higher
sales rate. We can evaluate as follows: in oﬄine markets,
since the seller’s proﬁt is equal to social welfare, the seller
always sells the asset. On the other hand, in an online auc-
tion, since it is a standard ascending auction, the seller sets
t h ep o s i t i v er e s e r v ep r i c et oi n c r e a s et h es a l e sp r i c e
11.
6. EXAMPLE
We now provide a simple numerical example to illustrate
the point.
Suppose the seller has an asset and wonders whether to
sell the asset in online auctions or oﬄine auctions. There
are three bidders interested in the asset, and each bidder
values the asset as an mean common value model
P
xi/3.
(1) Suppose the seller estimates that the bidders will have
signal distributed unif [2000, 18000] based on the informa-
tion the seller provides on the Internet. On the other hand,
11The model assumes that the seller has zero value of the
asset. As a result, the sales rate in the oﬄine auction is 100%
in the model. A modiﬁcation of the would be to assume that
the seller has the value of the item equal to the estimate
mean.
the seller has the option to hold an oﬄine auction. In the
oﬄine auction, the bidders need to pay 100 dollars to at-
tend the preview. The seller expects that the information
will be more accurate so that the bidders will have signals
from uniform [8000, 12000]. Should the seller hold an oﬄine
auction ?
(2) Suppose the seller estimates that the bidder will have
signal distributed unif [9200, 10800] based on the informa-
tion on the Internet. The seller can reduce the dispersion to
[9800, 10200]. Should the seller hold an oﬄine auction ?
(3) Suppose the seller estimates that the bidder will have
signal according to [0,16000]. Should the seller hold an of-
ﬂine auction ?
Solution. (1) First, compute the seller and bidder proﬁt
from online auctions. In expectation, bidder 1 has the signal
of 14000, bidder 2 has the signal of 10000, and bidder 3 has
6000. Bidder 3 will drop out at 6000 (this simpliﬁcation
is not without loss of generality due to linear structure of
the model. ) Consider a symmetric equilibrium where each
bidder drops oﬀ a tt h ep r i c ee q u a lt ob ev a l u eo ft h ea s s e t
given the signal of the bidders who have already dropped
out, and assuming all other remaining bidders having the
same signal with that bidder. Bidder 3 will drop out at 6000.
Bidder 2 will drop out at (6000+10000*2)/3=8667. The
seller’s expected price is 8666 and bidder’s ex ante expected
proﬁt is (10000-8667)/3=433.
Second, compute the proﬁts from oﬄine auctions. Sup-
pose all three bidders choose to enter the auction. In ex-
pectation, bidder 1 has the signal of 11,000 dollars; bidder 2
has 10,000 dollars; and bidder 3 has 9,000 dollars. Bidder 3
should drop out at 9,000 dollars. Then bidder 2 drops out at
(9,000+10000*2)/3=9666 dollars. That is, bidder 2 shades
the bid with 333 dollars. The seller’s revenue is 9666 dollars.
The bidder’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is 334/3=111 dollars.
Given that, each of three bidders will decide to enter the
auction, since the ex ante expected proﬁt of 111 is higher
than the entry cost of 100.
Third, compute the seller’s decision. In an online auc-
tion, the expected price is 8667. In an oﬄine auction, the
expected price is 9667-100=9556. Thus the seller will hold
an oﬄine auction.
(2) First, compute the equilibrium payoﬀs. Fourth, con-
sider the asset with the signal in online [9200, 10800]. On
mean, bidder 1 will have 10400, bidder 2 will have 10000 and
bidder 3 has 9600. Bidder 2 drops out at (9600+20000)/3=9867.
Thus the seller’s expected price is 9867 and the bidder’s ex
ante proﬁti s1 3 3 / 3 = 4 3 .
Second, compute payoﬀsf r o mo ﬄine auctions [9800, 10200].
On mean, bidder 1 has 10100, bidder 2 10000 and bidder 3
9900. Bidder 3 will drop out at (9900+10000*2)/3 = 9966.
The seller’s expected price is 9966 and the ex ante proﬁt
of the bidder is 34/3=11. Given this proﬁt, the third bid-
der will not enter. Then will the number of bidder be 2 ?
The price is 9933, and the expected proﬁt of each bidder is
67/2=34. Thus the second bidder will not enter. Thus only
one bidder will enter the auction, and he may bid the asset
with ε (depending on the formulation of bargaining between
the seller and the bidder).
Third, compute the seller’s choice. The seller’s price from
online auction is 9867 and   from oﬄine auction. Thus the
seller sells in online auctions.
The conclusion of this example is that the dispersion of
the estimation has an important eﬀect on the proﬁto ft h e
131seller in common value auctions. If the dispersion is large,
the seller may wish to hold an oﬄine auction with some
participation costs. But if the dispersion is small, it may
not pay to hold an oﬄine auction.
7. ESTIMATION
In this section, we start the estimation of transaction costs
and information revelation by formulating the qualitative
response models.
7.1 A qualitative response model
We consider the decision of the seller regarding whether
to sell the asset in online markets or in oﬄine markets. We
assume that the seller’s utility associated with the choice of
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The maximum likelihood estimator
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0. Given the smoothness, the consistency and asymptotic
normality of maximum likelihood estimator is standard (Amemiya
(1985), Section 9.2.2.)
7.2 An estimation
First, in this draft, we use a very simple parametriza-
tion. Z=uniform [−0.5,0.5], X = µ+σZ, ui(s,x)=
P
xi/n
where n is the number of bidders.
Second, compute the functional form of the discrete choice
model give above. In online auction




















Note the simple comparative statics result: the seller’s ex-
pected payoﬀ is decreasing in the dispersion and increasing
in the number of bidders. Now in in oﬄine auctions, the
number of bidders is determined by kσ/n(n +1 )=c. For
12We do not consider reserve prices in this estimation and
simulation. It is easy to compute Bulow and Klemperer
(1996) bounds.
simplicity, we approximate
13 the solution of this equation
by n =( kσ/c)
0.5 to make a model linear in parameters. We
set the number of bidders in the online market be 2. Note
1860/1300=1.43 was an mean number of bidders for online
auctions. Thus we obtain
π
on










Note that in this model, we cannot separately estimate k
and cbidder.
Third, we report the result of an estimation. For the pro-








1/2 3.011 .7443 4.05 0.000
cseller 222.2 22.80 9.74 0.000
Table 7: Estimates of Costs and Information Revelation
Parameter
A possible value of c is 90 for k =0 .1. There are 200˜300
auctions in one day for oﬄine auctions, so if they bid for 10
assets, the total bidding cost will be around 1000 dollars.
The threshold value where the bidder’s rent from selling
online is equal to that from selling oﬄine is 942.3 dollars.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the seller’s choice between on-
line and oﬄine markets. We examined the dataset from
Sotheby’s and identiﬁed robust empirical regularities con-
cerning the transaction price and the transaction rates. We
built a simple microstructure model of online and oﬄine
markets that emphasized the trade oﬀ between information
revelation and participation costs to explain these empirical
regularities.
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